



Application for review of a Ministerial decision

Customs Act 1901 s 269ZZE

This is the approved¹ form for applications made to the Anti-Dumping Review Panel (Review Panel) on or after 20 October 2025 for a review of a reviewable decision of the Minister.

Any interested party² may lodge an application to the Review Panel for review of a Ministerial decision.

All sections of the application form must be completed unless otherwise expressly stated in this form.

The Review Panel maintains a public record for reviews of decisions of the Minister. If a review is initiated, a copy of the application will be placed on the Review Panel's website.

Please note that the existence of applications will be disclosed on the Review Panel's 'Pending Applications and Duty Assessments' webpage prior to initiation, including the following information:

- Relevant reviewable decision
- Country and goods to which the application relates
- Number of applications
- Status (e.g. application/s under consideration)

Time

Applications must be made within 30 days after public notice of the reviewable decision is first published.

Conferences

The Review Panel may request that you or your representative attend a conference for the purpose of obtaining further information in relation to your application. The conference may be requested any time after the Review Panel receives the application for review and before beginning to conduct a review. Failure to attend this conference without reasonable excuse may lead to your application being rejected. See the Review Panel website for more information.

Further application information

You or your representative may be asked by the Member to provide further information in relation to your answers provided to questions 9, 10, 11 and/or 12 of this application form (s 269ZZG(1)). See the Review Panel website for more information.

¹ By the Senior Member of the Anti-Dumping Review Panel under section 269ZY *Customs Act 1901*.

² As defined in section 269ZX *Customs Act 1901*.

Withdrawal

You may withdraw your application at any time, by completing the withdrawal form on the Review Panel website.

International Trade Remedies Advisory (ITRA) Service

Small and medium enterprises (i.e., those with less than 200 full-time staff, which are independently operated and which are not a related body corporate for the purposes of the *Corporations Act 2001*), may obtain assistance, at no charge, from the ITRA Service.

For more information on the ITRA Service, visit www.business.gov.au or telephone the ITRA Service Hotline on +61 2 6213 7267

Contact

If you have any questions about what is required in an application refer to the Review Panel website. You can also call the Review Panel Secretariat on (02) 6276 1781 or email adrp@industry.gov.au.

PART A: APPLICANT INFORMATION**1. Applicant's details**

Applicant's name: Guangdong Xingfa Aluminium Co Ltd ("Xingfa")
Address: F22, 1st Floor, Block 23, No. 23, Qiangye Avenue, Leping Town, Sanshui District, Foshan City, China
Type of entity (trade union, corporation, government etc.): Corporation

2. Contact person for applicant

Full name: [REDACTED]
Position: Export manager
Email address: [REDACTED]
Telephone number: [REDACTED]

3. Set out the basis on which the applicant considers it is an interested party:

Xingfa is a producer and exporter of the subject goods, and was one of the Commission's sampled exporters for the inquiry.
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4. Is the applicant represented?

Yes ☒ No ☐

If the application is being submitted by someone other than the applicant, please complete the attached representative's authority section at the end of this form.

****It is the applicant's responsibility to notify the Review Panel Secretariat if the nominated representative changes or if the applicant become self-represented during a review.****

PART B: REVIEWABLE DECISION TO WHICH THIS APPLICATION RELATES

5. Indicate the section(s) of the *Customs Act 1901* the reviewable decision was made under:

☐ Subsection 269TG(1) or (2) – decision of the Minister to publish a dumping duty notice

☐ Subsection 269TH(1) or (2) – decision of the Minister to publish a third country dumping duty notice

☐ Subsection 269TJ(1) or (2) – decision of the Minister to publish a countervailing duty notice

☐ Subsection 269TK(1) or (2) – decision of the Minister to publish a third country countervailing duty notice

☐ Subsection 269TL(1) – decision of the Minister not to publish duty notice

☐ Subsection 269ZDB(1) – decision of the Minister following a review of anti-dumping measures

☐ Subsection 269ZDBH(1) – decision of the Minister following an anti-circumvention enquiry

☒ Subsection 269ZHG(1) – decision of the Minister in relation to the continuation of anti-dumping measures

Please only select **one** box. If you intend to select more than one box to seek review of more than one reviewable decision(s), **a separate application must be completed**.

6. Provide a full description of the goods which were the subject of the reviewable decision:

The description of aluminium extrusions exported from China that are subject of the reviewable decision are:

Aluminium extrusions produced via an extrusion process, of alloys having metallic elements falling within the alloy designations published by The Aluminium Association commencing with 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 or 7 (or proprietary or other certifying body equivalents), with the finish being as extruded (mill), mechanical, anodised or painted or otherwise coated, whether or not worked, having a wall thickness or diameter greater than 0.5 mm, with a maximum weight per metre of 27 kilograms and a profile or cross-section which fits within a circle having a diameter of 421 mm.

7. Provide the tariff classifications/statistical codes of the imported goods:

The goods are generally classified according to the following tariff subheadings in Schedule 3 to the Customs Tariff Act 1995:

Tariff subheading	Statistical code	Description
7604 – Aluminium bars, rods and profiles		
7604.10.00	06	Non alloyed aluminium bars, rods and profiles
7604.21.00	07	Aluminium alloy hollow angles and other shapes
	08	Aluminium alloy hollow profiles
7604.29.00	09	Aluminium alloy non hollow angles and other shapes
	10	Aluminium alloy non hollow profiles
7608 – Aluminium tubes and pipes		
7608.10.00	09	Non alloyed aluminium tubes and pipes
7608.20.00	10	Aluminium alloy tubes and pipes
7610 – Aluminium structures (incl. parts); Aluminium profiles for use in structures		
7610.10.00	12	Doors, windows and their frames and thresholds for doors
7610.90.00	13	Other

8. Anti-Dumping Notice details:

Anti-Dumping Notice (ADN) number: [ADN 2025/096](#)

Date ADN was published: [17 October 2025. Refer to Attachment A.](#)

****Attach a copy of the notice of the reviewable decision (as published on the Anti-Dumping Commission’s website) to the application****

PART C: GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICATION

If this application contains confidential or commercially sensitive information, the applicant must provide a non-confidential version of the application that contains sufficient detail to give other interested parties a clear and reasonable understanding of the information being put forward.

Confidential or commercially sensitive information must be **highlighted in yellow**, and the document marked ‘**CONFIDENTIAL**’ (bold, capitals, red font) at the top of each page. Non-confidential versions should be marked ‘**NON-CONFIDENTIAL**’ (bold, capitals, black font) at the top of each page.

- Personal information contained in a non-confidential application will be published unless otherwise redacted by the applicant/applicant’s representative.

For lengthy submissions, responses to this part may be provided in a separate document attached to the application. Please check this box if you have done so: ☒

Please note: Failure to adequately and accurately respond to questions 9 – 12 below may result in the application or ground/s being rejected pursuant to s 269ZZG(2) or s 269ZZG(5) of the *Customs Act 1901*. Where there are multiple grounds of review, it is important to address each of the questions below for each ground.

9. Set out the grounds on which the applicant believes that the reviewable decision is not the correct or preferable decision:

Please refer at Attachment B.

10. Identify what, in the applicant's opinion, the correct or preferable decision (or decisions) ought to be, resulting from the grounds raised in response to question 9:

Please refer at Attachment B.

11. Set out how the grounds raised in question 9 support the making of the proposed correct or preferable decision:

Please refer at Attachment B.

12. Set out the reasons why the proposed decision provided in response to question 10 is materially different from the reviewable decision:

Please refer at Attachment B.

13. Please list all attachments provided in support of this application:

Attachment A: ADN 2025/096
Confidential Attachment B: Grounds of review
Confidential Attachment C: Proposed billet premium
Confidential Attachment D: Estimated reduction on Xingfa's constructed normal values.
Confidential Attachment E: Proposed dumping margin

PART D: DECLARATION

The applicant's authorised representative declares that:

- The applicant understands that the Review Panel may hold conferences in relation to this application, either before or during the conduct of a review. The applicant understands that if the Review Panel decides to hold a conference *before* it gives public notice of its intention to conduct a review, and the applicant (or the applicant's representative) does not attend the conference without reasonable excuse, this application may be rejected; and
- The information and documents provided in this application are true and correct. The applicant understands that providing false or misleading information or documents to the Review Panel is an offence under the *Customs Act 1901* and *Criminal Code Act 1995*.

Signature:



Name: **JOHN BRACIC**

Position: **DIRECTOR**

Organisation: **J.BRACIC & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD**

Date: **14 / 11 / 2025**

PART E: AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE

This section must only be completed if you answered yes to question 4.

Provide details of the applicant's authorised representative:

Full name of representative: JOHN BRACIC
Organisation: J.BRACIC & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD
Address: PO BOX 3026, MANUKA, ACT 2603
Email address: john@jbracic.com.au
Telephone number: +61 (0)499 056 729

Representative's authority to act

****A separate letter of authority may be attached in lieu of the applicant signing this section****

The person named above is authorised to act as the applicant's representative in relation to this application and any review that may be conducted as a result of this application.

Signature: *[Signature deleted]*

Name: [REDACTED]

Position: **Export manager**

Organisation: **Guangdong Xingfa Aluminium Co Ltd**

Date: **12 / 11 / 2025**



J.BRACIC & ASSOCIATES
TRADE REMEDY ADVISORS

PO Box 3026
Manuka, ACT 2603
Mobile: +61 499 056 729
Email: john@jbracic.com.au
Web: www.jbracic.com.au

14 November 2025

Anti-Dumping Review Panel
c/o Legal, Audit and Assurance Branch
Department of Industry, Science and Resources
GPO Box 2013
Canberra ACT 2601

INTRODUCTION

On 17 October 2025, the Anti-Dumping Commission ("Commission") published its final report ("Report 657") into the continuation of anti-dumping measures on aluminium extrusions exported to Australia from the People's Republic of China ("China").

Guangdong Xingfa Aluminium Co Ltd ("Xingfa") is a producer and exporter of aluminium extrusions to Australia, and fully cooperated with the Commission's inquiry.

The Minister for Industry and Science (The Minister) accepted the recommendations contained in Report 657, and decided that the measures should continue to apply to aluminium extrusions exported from China. The Minister also decided to fix different specified variable factors in relation to Xingfa's exports, at a rate equal to a 4.0% dumping margin, and 0.6% subsidy margin.

Xingfa's application for review of the Minister's decision sets out grounds on which it considers that the Minister's decision to determine a dumping margin of 4.0%, is not correct or preferable.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FINDINGS

In section A8.3 of Appendix A to Report 657, the Commission compares the primary aluminium prices paid by selected exporters, including Xingfa, against a benchmark constructed as the London Metal Exchange (LME) price plus the Major Japan Premium (MJP), and inclusive of a billet premium. This benchmark is intended to represent an "equivalent" import price unaffected by the alleged particular market situation in China (as detailed in Appendix C to Report 657).

The Commission observes that Xingfa's billet purchases were below this benchmark for 11 months of the period of investigation (POI). It further notes that billet prices should incorporate the ingot price, ingot premium, billet premium, manufacturing costs, expenses,

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and profit. However, the analysis infers a particular market situation distortion from the failure of Chinese billet prices to fully reflect these components, particularly the billet premium, relative to the benchmark.

Critically, the benchmark's billet premium component is derived from Malaysian import contracts referenced by another of the sampled cooperating exporters, Press Metal International Ltd ("PMI"), which involve transactions between PMI and its related entities in Malaysia. The Commission accepts this premium as a proxy, stating that PMI's Malaysian import prices were "consistent with the benchmark, after considering the terms specified in the contracts".

This application seeks review specifically on the Commission's determination of the billet premium component within Xingfa's constructed normal value, which relies on costs derived from a non-arm's length transaction between related entities within the PMI group. Xingfa submits that this approach is unreasonable and inconsistent with established principles of anti-dumping methodology, including those affirmed in relevant World Trade Organisation ("WTO") jurisprudence.

For the reasons outlined below, Xingfa contends that the Minister ought to revise Xingfa's dumping margin accordingly, by relying on verified billet conversion cost information that was found to reflect competitive market costs.

QUESTION 9: SET OUT THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE APPLICANT BELIEVES THAT THE REVIEWABLE DECISION IS NOT THE CORRECT OR PREFERABLE DECISION:

The Minister erred in constructing Xingfa's normal values by relying on non-arms length transactions between related parties.

In the Report 657, the Commission constructs the normal value for Xingfa's products using surrogate data. Within this construction, the billet premium, which represents the additional cost of aluminium billet over the base London Metal Exchange ("LME") price, plays a critical role in accurately reflecting production costs, as it captures the costs incurred in converting aluminium ingots into aluminium billets.

In Xingfa's case, the Commission calculated the premium by reference to a weighted average of:

- Xingfa's self-produced billet cost calculated by adding the monthly billet conversion costs incurred by Xingfa to the ingot benchmark for the same month; and
- monthly billet benchmark prices used by the commission, adjusted to reflect Xingfa Aluminium's inland delivery costs.

The monthly billet benchmark prices are based on quotes by PMI's related Malaysian supplier of billet into China. It is understood that the quotes are derived from internal transfers between PMI and its related smelting and extrusion entities in Malaysia.

Importantly, the Commission acknowledges in Report 657 '*...that the billet benchmark price used includes profit and selling cost components which are not relevant to Xingfa Aluminium's self-produced billet*'. So in calculating the billet premium component, the Commission considered that Xingfa's conversion costs were relevant and appropriate for this purpose, but also

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considered that the billet benchmark derived from PMI should be included, despite Xingfa's conversion costs being found to be reliable, and undistorted from the factors that affected the cost of primary ingot and primary billet purchases.

Non-arms length billet benchmark

In its Statement of Essential Report 657, the Commission preliminarily found that:

PMI's records in relation to its purchase of Malaysian origin aluminium (ingot and billet) from related entities does not reasonably reflect competitive costs because the price of the aluminium appears to be influenced by a commercial or other relationship between the buyer, or an associate of the buyer, and the seller, or an associate of the seller (section 269TAA(1)(b)).

In other words, PMI's purchase of aluminium from related parties in Malaysia is not arms length and the price paid is below the contract LME + MJP import price to China established between the parties.

In Report 657, the Commission overturned its position following submissions from PMI, in which it contended '*... that according to its records and those of its supplier, there are no inconsistencies between contract prices and amounts actually paid including for matters such as inland freight.*' The Commission noted that its '*... preliminary assessment was based on an initial assessment of PMI's purchases of aluminium from related parties in Malaysia which indicated that the price paid was below the contracted LME + MJP import price to China established between the parties.*'

It appears that the Commission's preliminary and final assessments, were limited to merely checking whether the contracted prices between the related parties were accurately reflected in PMI's accounts. Despite the entities within the PMI group being under common control, and in a legal sense not at arms length, the Commission made no apparent attempt to assess and determine whether the parties dealt with each other as arms length parties would, and whether the agreed contracted prices and quotes, were the result of real bargaining.

This reliance on PMI's internal pricing without any assessment as to whether real bargaining was taking place between the parties, is considered grounds for submitting that the billet premium benchmark included in Xingfa's constructed normal values was inadequate, and not correct or preferable.

Xingfa submits that incorporating a billet premium from non-arm's length transactions between PMI and its related Malaysian entities renders the benchmark fundamentally unreliable for assessing Chinese market conditions. Such transactions lack the competitive pressures inherent in arm's length dealings, potentially inflating or deflating premiums in ways that do not reflect prevailing market dynamics. The Commission's acceptance of these prices without independent verification or adjustment for affiliation, introduces an arbitrary element that skews the comparison of Xingfa's verified costs against an unrepresentative external reference.

The Commission's adopted methodology is particularly problematic in the context of billet pricing, where premiums are sensitive to regional supply chains, logistics, and contractual specifics. PMI's related-party contracts, set by reference to LME + MJP + "Malaysian billet

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premium", may embed transfer pricing strategies or internal allocations not aligned with third-party market rates. By elevating these to benchmark status, the Commission is effectively penalising Xingfa, whose arm's length domestic purchases of billet are reflective of genuine and legitimate bargaining between unrelated buyer and seller.

The unreasonableness of this approach is compounded by the Commission's own acknowledgment that imported primary ingots and billets accounted for only 2.5% of sampled exporters' purchases, with even lower reliance on Malaysian-sourced billets. Relying on a benchmark dominated by a single exporter's affiliated transactions disregards the diversity of input sourcing among cooperating parties.

Further, transfer pricing transactions between related entities are inherently susceptible to misalignment with prevailing market conditions. Transfer pricing in such scenarios often serves internal corporate objectives, such as tax optimisation or profit allocation, rather than reflecting genuine economic value. In the context of billet premiums, which fluctuate with global supply chain dynamics, raw material sourcing, and energy costs, internal PMI data cannot credibly substitute for arm's length benchmarks. The Commission's failure to discount or exclude these figures overlooks the core purpose of surrogate value methodology, which is to approximate what the billet conversion costs would be in a competitive market.

The lack of any reasonable arms-length assessment demonstrates that the PMI billet premium data was not subject to rigorous arm's length adjustments. Without evidence of independent validation, such as cross-referencing against LME premium indices, third-party supplier quotes into the Chinese market, or published industry reports, these costs cannot be deemed reliable.

The Commission's substitution of verified exporter costs with a benchmark incorporating non-arm's length data parallels practices critiqued in the WTO Panel Report in *Australia – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Certain Products from China* (WT/DS603/R). In that dispute, the Panel examined the Commission's rejection of exporters' recorded costs for inputs, where the Commission substituted external benchmarks derived from non-market sources or unrelated transactions on grounds that the costs did "not reasonably reflect" conditions in the exporting country.

The Panel found such substitutions inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), emphasising that investigating authorities must base the constructed value on the exporter's actual records unless those records are demonstrably unreliable due to non-market influences. The Panel explicitly rejected the Commission's use of benchmarks from "outside China" or non-cost data as a default adjustment, holding that:

The expression 'cost of production in the country of origin' in Article 2.2 has been understood as 'a reference to the price paid or to be paid to produce something within the country of origin'. The Appellate Body has further explained that Article 2.2 do[es] not preclude the possibility that the authority may also need to look for such information from sources outside the country. The reference to 'in the country of origin', however, indicates that, whatever information or evidence is used to determine the 'cost of production', it must be apt to or capable of yielding a cost of production in the country of origin. This, in turn, suggests that information or evidence from

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outside the country of origin may need to be adapted in order to ensure that it is suitable to determine a 'cost of production' 'in the country of origin'.

Applied here, the Commission's billet premium benchmark, which includes data sourced from PMI's related-party Malaysian contracts, mirrors the flawed methodology in DS603. Xingfa's billet costs, drawn from arm's length Chinese suppliers and aligned with published indices, reasonably reflect domestic conditions. Substituting these with an affiliated premium lacks the justification required under Article 2.2 and, by extension, section 269TAC, as it presumes distortion without producer-specific evidence. The Panel's rulings affirm that such practices risk violating the ADA's core principle of using "actual costs" as the starting point.

Critically, Xingfa contends that it is not appropriate to include a billet premium in the benchmark that is greater than Xingfa's actual incurred conversion cost of self-producing billet. Xingfa has the capability and capacity to self-produce billet using purchases of aluminium ingot. Whether it decides to self-produce billet or simply purchase billet is determined by the prevailing domestic billet premium relative to Xingfa's conversion cost of processing ingot into billet.

Xingfa will opt to self-produce aluminum billet rather than purchase it when the prevailing billet premium (ie, the additional cost charged above the base aluminum price), exceeds its unit conversion cost of processing ingot into billet. The billet premiums are influenced by market dynamics, such as supply chain constraints, demand fluctuations, or quality factors, which can inflate the cost of purchased billet. When Xingfa's own conversion costs, including labor, energy, equipment, and overheads, are lower than this premium, self-production becomes economically advantageous. By producing billet in-house, Xingfa can bypass the premium, reducing the overall cost per unit. The vertical integration through self-production also mitigates risks associated with supplier dependency, such as price volatility or supply disruptions, which enable predictability and operational stability.

From pure market principles, Xingfa's decision to self-produce is driven by a cost-benefit analysis that compares the capital expenditure and operational costs of maintaining billet production capacity, against the cost savings when billet premiums are relatively lower. This approach aligns with economic principles of cost minimisation and risk management, ensuring that Xingfa maximises its returns while maintaining flexibility in a volatile market environment.

The Commission has erred by including internal transfer pricing quotes between PMI and its related Malaysian entities, without verification against independent market data, or adjustment to ensure they reflect Chinese-specific factors like labor, materials, and profit to ensure representation of costs in China. Xingfa contends that this reliance introduces material distortions into the normal value calculation, leading to inflated dumping margins that do not reflect fair value comparisons.

The Commission's decision to include costs from a company in a third country, again contravenes its obligations under subsection 269TAC(2)(b), and Article 2.2 of the ADA. As noted by the Panel in reviewing the Commission reliance on steel billet costs from a French company in the original investigation into railway wheels from China:

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We consider that the ADC did not reasonably demonstrate that the surrogate costs represented costs of production in China. The costs were taken from a producer in a different country, and the only adjustment made was related to Masteel being a vertically integrated producer of steel billet. There is no explanation in the ADC's findings as to why a French company's cost of purchasing steel billet would meaningfully represent a Chinese company's cost of producing steel billet in China.

As highlighted by Xingfa in its submission to Review 657, its conversion costs including labor, energy, and other manufacturing overheads, have not been found by the Commission to be distorted, and were in fact found to reasonably reflect competitive market costs. The Commission's finding that costs do not reasonably reflect competitive market costs is limited to the raw material purchase prices for primary ingot and billet. This is confirmed by the Commission's use of Xingfa's conversion costs in constructing normal values for aluminum extrusions produced from purchased billet, and its inclusion of those same conversion costs as a part of the billet benchmark.

Accordingly, it makes no sense why those same conversion costs relating to aluminium extrusions manufactured from billet, aren't relied upon for the billet premium, and instead included with internal transfer prices between PMI and its related Malaysia entity, without any adjustment for differences in comparative advantages between the two countries.

In light of the above, Xingfa contends that the Minister erred in constructing Xingfa's normal values by reference to the billet premiums derived from an internal transfer pricing arrangement between PMI and its related entities in Malaysia, without proper adjustment to ensure the premium reflects a cost in China.

QUESTION 10: IDENTIFY WHAT, IN THE APPLICANT'S OPINION, THE CORRECT OR PREFERABLE DECISION (OR DECISIONS) OUGHT TO BE, RESULTING FROM THE GROUNDS RAISED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION 9.

In Xingfa's opinion, the correct or preferable decision was to disregard the billet premium's derived from PMI's non-arm's length transactions, and instead rely solely on Xingfa's actual verified conversion costs relating to its actual conversion of ingot into billet. These conversion costs were found to reasonably reflect competitive market costs and accurately reflected in Xingfa's account. As such, the Commission was compelled to rely on such information for the purposes of constructing normal values.

The proposed conversion costs are contained within **Confidential Attachment C**.

QUESTION 11: SET OUT HOW THE GROUNDS RAISED IN QUESTION 9 SUPPORT THE MAKING OF THE PROPOSED CORRECT OR PREFERABLE DECISION.

Support for the proposed decision stems from the Commission's stated policy and practice surrounding arms length assessments, international jurisprudence arising from recent WTO Panel findings that examined the Commission's practices, and Xingfa's verified information that was available to the Commission.

QUESTION 12: SET OUT THE REASONS WHY THE PROPOSED DECISION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION 10 IS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE REVIEWABLE DECISION.

By relying solely on Xingfa's actual verified conversion costs for the billet premium component of the billet benchmark, Xingfa estimates that its constructed normal values would be reduced by approximately 2.8%. This reflects the difference between the Commission's calculation of Xingfa's "Self Produced Billet Cost based on Ingot Benchmark (RMB/MT)" and its calculated weighted average "Benchmark Billet, adjusted for self production".

This 2.8% difference has been estimated using the Commission's Benchmark Uplift Calculation worksheet, which is included as **Confidential Attachment D**.

This reduction would result in Xingfa's dumping margin being reduced from 4.0% to 1.89%. Please refer to **Confidential Attachment E**, for supporting calculations of the proposed dumping margin.



ANTI-DUMPING NOTICE NO. 2025/096

Customs Act 1901 – Part XVB

Aluminium Extrusions

Exported from the People's Republic of China

Findings of the Continuation Inquiry No 657 into Anti-Dumping Measures

Public Notice under section 269ZHG(1) of the Customs Act 1901, subsection 8(5) and subsection 10(3B) of the Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975

The Commissioner of the Anti-Dumping Commission (the Commissioner) has completed an inquiry, which commenced on 8 November 2024, into whether the continuation of the anti-dumping measures in the form of a dumping and countervailing duty notice applying to aluminium extrusions exported to Australia from the People's Republic of China (China) is justified.

Exports of Guangdong Jiangsheng Aluminium Co Ltd and Guangdong Zhongya Aluminium Company Ltd are not covered by this inquiry, as the measures currently in place in relation to aluminium extrusions do not apply to exports of the goods by these companies.

Recommendations resulting from that inquiry, reasons for the recommendations, and material findings of fact and law in relation to the inquiry are contained in *Anti-Dumping Commission Report No. 657* (REP 657).

I, TIM AYRES, the Minister for Industry and Innovation and Minister for Science, have considered REP 657 and have decided to accept the recommendation and reasons for the recommendation, including all the material findings of facts and law therein and have decided that the anti-dumping measures applying to aluminium extrusions exported to Australia from China should continue from 29 October 2025.

Under subsection 269ZHG(1)(b) of the *Customs Act 1901* (the Act), I **declare** that I have decided to secure the continuation of the anti-dumping measures currently applying to aluminium extrusions exported to Australia from China.

I **determine** that

- pursuant to subsection 269ZHG(4)(a)(i) of the Act, the notice continues in force after 28 October 2025 in relation to Xiamen Hopergy Photovoltaic Technology Co.,

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Ltd,¹ and

- pursuant to subsection 269ZHG(4)(a)(iii) of the Act, the notice continues in force after 28 October 2025, but after this day has effect as if different specified variable factors had been fixed in relation to all exporters generally

In accordance with subsection 8(5BB) of the *Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act* 1975 (Dumping Duty Act), and the *Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Regulation* 2013 (the Regulation), the duty that has been determined is an amount worked out in accordance with the combination of fixed and variable duty method pursuant to subsections 5(2) and (3) of the Regulation, the floor price duty method pursuant to subsections 5(4) and (5) of the Regulation, or the *ad valorem* duty method pursuant to subsection 7 of the Regulation, as detailed in the table below.

Particulars of the dumping and subsidy margins established for each of the exporters and the effective rates of duty are also set out in the following table.

Exporter	Dumping Margin	Subsidy Margin	Effective rate of interim countervailing duty and interim dumping duty*	Duty Method
Goomax Metal Co., Ltd	-7.2%	5.6%	5.6%	Floor price duty method for IDD.
Guangdong Jinxiecheng Al. Manufacturing Co., Ltd	-9.8%	0.8%	0.8%	<i>ad valorem</i> duty method for ICD.
Press Metal International Ltd	17.7%	1.6%	18.1%	Combination of fixed and variable duty method for IDD.
Guangdong Xingfa Aluminium Co., Ltd	4.0%	0.6%	4.5%	<i>ad valorem</i> duty method for ICD.
Residual exporters	-0.9%	1.7%	1.7%	Floor price duty method for IDD. <i>ad valorem</i> duty method for ICD.
Uncooperative, noncooperative and all other exporters	28.4%	5.7%	29.4%	Combination of fixed and variable duty method for IDD. <i>ad valorem</i> duty method for ICD.

* The calculation of combined dumping and countervailing duties is not simply a matter of adding the dumping and subsidy margins together for any given exporter, or group of exporters. Rather, the collective interim dumping duty and interim countervailing duty imposed in relation to the goods, is the sum of:

- the subsidy rate calculated for all countervailable programs, and
- the dumping rates calculated, less an amount for the subsidy rate applying to Program 15.²

¹ On 7 August 2025, the Minister declared that from 3 April 2025, the dumping duty notice and countervailing duty notice be altered to as to apply to Xiamen Hopergy Photovoltaic Technology Co., Ltd with different variable factors. See ADN2025/062 for further information.

² See Chapter 9 of REP 657 for further information concerning the adjustment for the subsidy rate applying to Program 15.

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Interested parties may seek a review of this decision by lodging an application with the Anti-Dumping Review Panel (www.adreviewpanel.gov.au), in accordance with the requirements in Division 9 of Part XVB of the Act, within 30 days of the publication of this notice.

REP 657 has been placed on the public record, which may be examined at the Anti-Dumping Commission Office by contacting the case manager on the details provided below. Alternatively, the public record is available online at www.adcommission.gov.au

Enquiries about this notice may be directed to the Case Manager on telephone number +61 3 8539 2408 or email investigations3@adcommission.gov.au.

Dated this 16th day of October 2025

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'T Ayres', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

TIM AYRES
Minister for Industry and Innovation and Minister for Science