

6 March 2026

Director
Investigations 4
Anti-Dumping Commission
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Dear Director,

Public File

Continuation inquiry No. 657 – Aluminium Extrusions exported from China
Preliminary Reinvestigation Report – PRR 657

I. Introduction

Capral Limited (**Capral**) makes this submission in response to the Anti-Dumping Commission's (**the Commission**) Preliminary Reinvestigation Report (**the PRR**) in respect of Continuation inquiry no. 657 (**CON 657**). The PRR was published on 24 February 2026.

Capral is the applicant industry representative that sought the continuation of anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures applying to aluminium extrusions exported to Australia from the People's Republic of China (**China**) under CON 657.

The PRR was prepared by the Commissioner of the Anti-Dumping Commission (**the Commissioner**) in response to a request from the Anti-Dumping Review Panel (**ADRP**) under section 269ZZL of the *Customs Act 1901*. In the PRR, the Commissioner has preliminarily found that manufacturers of the aluminium billet provided to Goomax Metal Co., Ltd's (**Goomax**) were not state-invested enterprises (**SIEs**) or state-owned enterprises (**SOEs**), and that Goomax was therefore not in receipt of the less than adequate remuneration (**LTAR**) subsidy (Program 15).

In this submission, Capral provides its position and views on:

- the preliminary factual finding regarding Goomax supplier ownership status;
- the admissibility of the evidence relied upon in the reinvestigation; and
- the significance of the broader subsidy and particular market situation (**PMS**) findings to Goomax's overall duty liability.

II. The preliminary factual finding

Capral does not oppose the Commissioner's preliminary factual finding¹ that the two manufacturers of aluminium billet supplied to Goomax were not SIEs or SOEs during the inquiry period. Capral acknowledges that the Commission's reassessment of the ownership structures of these entities supports this conclusion.

Capral notes that this finding is consistent with the treatment of Guangdong Jinxiacheng Al Manufacturing Co., Ltd (**Jinxiacheng**) in REP 657. In REP 657, the Commission accepted evidence submitted by Jinxiacheng

¹ For absolute clarity, however, Capral does oppose the admissibility of the evidence provided by Goomax (which was provided to the ADRP after CON 657), as addressed later in this submission.



demonstrating that its raw material suppliers were privately held entities and, on that basis, excluded Program 15 from Jinxiacheng's subsidy margin.

Capral further notes that this position regarding Jinxiacheng has been maintained consistently since Continuation Inquiry No. 543 (REP 543), which covered the inquiry period of July 2018 to June 2019. To the extent that the factual position regarding Goomax's suppliers is analogous, Capral accepts the preliminary finding on its factual merits.

III. Admissibility of Goomax evidence

Notwithstanding Capral's acceptance of the factual finding, Capral submits that the ADRP and the Commissioner should have careful regard to the admissibility of the evidence that gave rise to the reinvestigation, in light of the strict legislative tests of the consideration of such.

On this, Capral agrees with and adopts the submissions made by the Commissioner in Part B of the Commissioner's Submission to the ADRP dated 19 December 2025, in particular paragraphs 86 to 91.²

In that submission, the Commissioner correctly noted that pursuant to section 269ZZK(6) of the Act, the scope of relevant information the ADRP can consider is the information the Commissioner had regard to when making the findings and recommendations set out in REP 657. The corporate registry evidence contained in "Attachment 4" to Goomax's ADRP application was not submitted to the commission during CON 657.

As the Commissioner observed in its ADRP submission,³ while Goomax stated in its response to the exporter questionnaire that none of its suppliers were SIEs or SOEs, it did not provide the requested supporting evidence. Capral therefore submits that the requisite 'relevant information' was not submitted during CON 657.

This is contrasted to the position of Jinxiacheng, which provided company record searches and shareholder information to the Commission on 1 August 2025 (prior to the publication of REP 657 on 16 October 2025). The Commission assessed that evidence, undertook independent verification through the Chinese companies register, and adjusted Jinxiacheng's subsidy margin accordingly in the final report. Jinxiacheng's evidence was before the Commissioner at the time the findings in REP 657 were made.

Goomax hence had ample opportunity to submit equivalent evidence during CON 657, including in response to the preliminary variable factors assessment and/or the Statement of Essential Facts, but failed to do so. As the Commissioner noted in its ADRP submission, Goomax could have provided such information as Jinxiacheng did, but did not.⁴

Capral therefore submits that while the factual conclusion reached in the PRR may be correct on its merits, the procedural avenue by which that conclusion was reached raises significant questions about the integrity of the ADRP review process. If exporters are permitted to withhold evidence during an inquiry and subsequently introduce it on review, the cooperative framework underpinning Australia's anti-dumping system is fundamentally undermined.

IV. The Chinese market situation finding remains unaffected

Even if the Commissioner's preliminary finding in the PRR is confirmed in the final reinvestigation report, Capral submits that the practical significance of the LTAR finding for Goomax's overall duty liability is limited, having regard to the broader subsidy and PMS findings in REP 657.

² The Commissioner's ADRP Submission p. 17-18.

³ Ibid, paragraph 87.

⁴ Ibid, paragraph 90.



Goomax remains in receipt of several countervailable subsidies

As set out in REP 657,⁵ Goomax was found to be in receipt of countervailable subsidies under nine programs during the inquiry period, comprising Program 15 (LTAR), Program 47 (preferential tax for high and new technology enterprises), Program 609-14 (labour cooperation subsidies), and six newly identified grant programs (Programs 657-24 through 657-29). Removal of Program 15 from Goomax's subsidy margin does not negate the findings in respect of the remaining eight programs.

Moreover, as the Commissioner noted at paragraph 91 of the Commissioner's ADRP Submission, even removing the volume of raw materials purchased from the common privately-held supplier from Goomax's Program 15 calculation would not have altered the LTAR subsidy amount or the total subsidy margin. This is because Goomax also purchased a significant volume of raw materials from another entity which the Commission's research identified as having SIE/SOE ownership.

The final subsidy margin for Goomax under CON 657 has been assessed as 5.6 percent.⁶

The China PMS finding remains unaffected

The Commission's ongoing finding of a PMS in the domestic Chinese aluminium extrusions market, as most recently assessed in Appendix A of REP 657, is entirely independent of the ownership status of Goomax's individual raw material suppliers. The PMS finding rests on extensive positive evidence of systemic Government of China (GOC) intervention in the primary and secondary aluminium markets, including:

- the GOC's maintenance of a production capacity cap of 45 million tonnes through the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the approaching of that cap with approximately 43 million tonnes produced in 2024, representing approximately 60 percent of global production;⁷
- the central role of SOEs and SIEs in primary aluminium production, with the Aluminium Corporation of China Limited (Chalco) operating as a wholly state-owned enterprise with independently published pricing that trades within GOC-imposed annual price caps;⁸
- the establishment of the China Resources Recycling Group Co. Ltd (CRRG) in October 2024, a centrally managed SOE with equity held by SASAC, Chalco and other major state entities, to control the secondary aluminium market;⁹
- GOC involvement in the energy sector through discounted electricity provision and energy consumption caps that favour large SOE producers with the capital to transition to renewable energy sources;¹⁰
- below-market finance policies identified by the OECD, with China-based companies found to be significantly more likely to benefit from below-market borrowings than companies in other jurisdictions;¹¹
- GOC taxation and tariff policies designed to discourage export of primary aluminium while encouraging export of downstream products such as aluminium extrusions;¹² and
- the operation of the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration's aluminium stockpiling

⁵ At Chapter 7.5 and Table 23.

⁶ REP 657, p. 87.

⁷ Ibid, p. 134.

⁸ Ibid, p. 139 and elsewhere.

⁹ Ibid, p. 135.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 150.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 151.

¹² Ibid, p. 152.



program to manage domestic price fluctuations.¹³

The Commission's benchmark comparison analysis in REP 657¹⁴ demonstrated that the weighted average Chinese prices paid for billet by the selected exporters were below the LME + MJP benchmark price for the entire inquiry period, with Chinese prices being between 2 percent and 13 percent lower. Billet comprised approximately 80 percent of the primary aluminium consumed by the selected exporters. Capral submits that this divergence is a function of systemic market distortions, not the ownership status of any individual supplier.

The PMS finding underpins the determination that domestic sales in the Chinese aluminium extrusions market are not suitable for determining normal values under section 269TAC(1), thereby requiring the construction of normal values under section 269TAC(2)(c). This finding applies to all Chinese exporters, including Goomax, regardless of whether their individual suppliers are classified as SIEs, SOEs or privately held entities.

The Goomax dumping margin remains unaffected

Goomax's dumping margin of 0.0 percent as determined in REP 657 is calculated independently of the subsidy margin. The constructed normal value methodology applied to Goomax, which incorporates the LME + MJP import price to China benchmark in place of Goomax's recorded aluminium costs, is a result of the PMS finding and the determination that Goomax's recorded costs did not reasonably reflect competitive market costs. Neither of these findings is affected by the ownership status of certain of Goomax's suppliers.

Accordingly, even if Program 15 is removed from Goomax's subsidy margin in its entirety, the broader framework of anti-dumping measures applying to Goomax – including the constructed normal value methodology and the effective rate of interim dumping duty – remains in place.

If you have any questions concerning this submission, please do not hesitate to contact Capral's representative Mr Chad Uphill on 0412 377 603.

Yours sincerely



¹³ Ibid, p. 142.

¹⁴ Ibid, Appendix A.

