PROTECTED

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND RESOURCES

MS25-000450

To: Minister for Resources (For Decision)

s 33(a)(iii)

- US SECTION 232 INVESTIGATION INTO

PROCESSED CRITICAL MINERALS AND DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS

Timing: By COB AWST Thursday, 15 May 2025 s 33(a)(iii)

Recommendation:			
s 45			
		Арр	proved / Not approved
Minister:	Date:		
Comments:			
Clearing Officer:	Donna Looney	Head of Division,	Ph: \$ 22
	Doma Looney	International Strategy	Mob: \$ 22
		and National Security	
Contact Officer:	Matthew Deady	A/g General Manager,	Ph: \$ 22
	,	Trade, Americas,	Mob: \$ 22
		Europe and India	
		Branch	
For Parliamentary Services' use only.		14/5/2025	
Date Submitted to the Minister's office in PDMS:			14/5/2025

Key Points:

s 33(a)(iii)

2. On 22 April 2025, on request from President Trump, the US Department of Commerce (US DOC) launched an investigation under Section 232 of the *Trade Expansion Act* 1962 (s232 investigation) to evaluate the effects of imports of processed critical minerals and derivative products on US national security. A copy of the Federal Register Notice is at Attachment B.

4.	s 33	/ _ \	/:::\
4	S .5.51	aı	(1111)

. Further information on timing of the investigation is available at

PROTECTED

Attachment C.

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

s 45

Next steps:

7. The US Secretary of Commerce will present their findings to President Trump in October 2025.

Sensitivities and Handling:

8. s 45

Consultation with the Partnerships and Projects Division, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts: YES

10. Nil comments provided.

Other Consultation: YES

11. Internal – Minerals and Resources Division (Critical Minerals Office; Critical Minerals Security Branch); Analysis and Insights Division; International Strategy and National Security Division.

s 33(a)(iii), s 45

ATTACHMENTS:

s 33(a)(iii)

- **B:** Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products
- C: Timeline: Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products













Attachment C: Timeline – Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products (s232 investigation)

Executive Order 14272 establishes an accelerated timeframe for the US Department of Commerce to complete the s232 investigation – in 180 days, compared to the standard 270 days.

Date	Action
15 April 2025	President Trump issued Executive Order 14272. This Executive Order tasked the US Secretary of Commerce to initiate the s232 investigation.
22 April	The Bureau of Industry and Security (an arm of the US Department of Commerce) formally announced the s232 investigation.
16 May 2025	Public comments on the s232 investigation are due to the US Bureau of Industry and Security.
14 July 2025 (90 days after the Executive Order 14272 is issued)	The US Secretary of Commerce will submit for internal review a draft interim report to: US Secretary of Treasury US Secretary of Defence The United States Trade Representative The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy The Senior Counsellor to the President for Trade and Manufacturing.
29 July 2025 (15 days after the US Secretary of Commerce shares the draft interim report)	Officials (listed above) to provide comments on the interim report to the US Secretary of Commerce.
October 2025 (within 180 days of the date on which the s232 investigation commenced)	The US Secretary of Commerce will submit a final report and recommendations to the US President, for consideration.



S 22

From: Looney, Donna

Sent: Friday, 23 May 2025 4:55 PM

To: Jeremenko, Robert; Quinn, Meghan; Pickworth, Julia

Cc: Oliver, Tara; Chang, Carl; S 22 Chesworth, Peter; S 22

Office of the Secretary; S 22 S 22 Mason, Geoff; S 22

Subject: For Information - US DOC antidumping and countervailing investigations on

silicon metal [SEC=PROTECTED]

Hi Meghan, Julia and Robert

For your awareness see below

Happy to discuss

Thanks

DL

From:S 22

Sent: Friday, 23 May 2025 3:48 PM

To: Looney, Donna

cc:S 22 ; Trade Policy Section ; RSG - IS&NS - TAE&IB - United States/Canada

<RSG-IS&NS-TAE&IB-UnitedStates/Canada@industry.gov.au>

Subject: For Information - US DOC antidumping and countervailing investigations on silicon metal[SEC=PROTECTED]

PROTECTED

Good afternoon Donna,

On 14 May 2025 (EST), the US Department of Commerce (US DOC) initiated antidumping duty investigations on silicon metal from Angola, Australia, Laos and Norway, and countervailing duty investigations on silicon metal from Australia, Laos, Norway and Thailand.

The investigations will examine whether DISR programs (among others) unfairly subsidised Australian silicon exports to the US (R&D Tax Incentive; Critical Minerals Strategy), creating injury for US domestic manufacturers. The period for the investigation will be 1 January 2024 through 31

December 2024. S 47G

S 47G S 47G

S 47G

\$47G

s 45

Other programs referenced in the investigations include Export Finance Australia (DFAT), the NAIF (Infrastructure) and a WA Government battery and critical minerals strategies (DISR's Battery Strategy team is aware of this). DFAT are coordinating government response across all agencies.

s 47C(1)

Indicative forward timeline (from DFAT)

Below is an indicative forward timeline only. Please note that US DOC deadlines are likely to be extended for the anti-dumping investigation, as authorised by their domestic laws.

Event	Earliest Date	Extended Date
Petition Filed	April 24, 2025	
DOC Initiation	May 14, 2025	
ITC Preliminary Investigation:		
Questionnaires Due	May 8, 2025	

Request to appear at hearing	May 13, 2025	
Hearing	May 15, 2025	
Briefs	May 20, 2025	
ITC Vote	June 8, 2025	
DOC Investigation Schedule:		
DOC Preliminary Antidumping Determination	October 1, 2025	November 20, 2025
DOC Final Antidumping Determination	December 15, 2025	April 4, 2026
DOC Preliminary Countervailing Determination	July 18, 2025	September 21, 2025
DOC Final Countervailing Determination	October 1, 2025	December 5, 2025
ITC Final Investigation:		
ITC Final AD Determination	January 29, 2026	May 19, 2026
ITC Final CVD Determination	November 15, 2025	January 19, 2026

Happy to discuss if you have any questions.

Thanks for your time.

Kind regards S 22

S 22 (She/Her)

Manager (A/g)

Trade Policy and Programs Section

International Strategy and National Security Division | Trade, Americas, Europe and India Branch Department of Industry, Science and Resources
Ngunnawal Country, Industry House, 10 Binara Street, GPO Box 2013 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

Phone S 22 Extension S 22 I Email S 22 @industry.gov.au

We work flexibly. If you have received this email outside of normal business hours, I am sending it at a time that suits me. Unless urgent, there is no requirement to read or respond to this email until normal business hours.

PROTECTED

s 22, s 33(a)(i), s 33(a)(ii), s 33(a)(iii)

s 22, s 33(a)(i), s 33(a)(ii), s 33(a)(iii)

S 22

From: Looney, Donna

Sent: Monday, 19 May 2025 2:00 PM

To: Coleman, Laurence

Cc: S 22 Quinn, Meghan; Jeremenko, Robert; DLO King; S 22

S 22

Subject: Slides for International Strategy discussion today 14.00 AWEST/16.00 AEST

Attachments: Strategic Partnerships Overarching - Resources.pptx

Hi Laurence

Slides attached for the discussion this afternoon.

s 33(a)(iii)

Thanks

DL

If using assistive software, the message ends here. Email signature below.

Donna Looney Head of Division International Strategy and National Security



Disability and Wellness Network Champion

Department of Industry, Science and Resources

Ngunnawal Country, Industry House, 10 Binara Street (GPO Box 2013) Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

P-S 22 | MS 22 ES 22 @industry.gov.au

Executive Officer: S 22 | P S 22 | S 22 @industry.gov.au | S 22 @industry.gov.au | S 22 @industry.gov.au

industry.gov.au ABN 74 599 608 295

Supporting economic growth and job creation for all Australians | We are collaborative, innovative, respectful and strive for excellence





Acknowledgement of Country

Our department recognises the First Peoples of this nation and their ongoing connection to culture and country. We acknowledge First Nations Peoples as the Traditional Owners, Custodians and Lore Keepers of the world's oldest living culture and pay respects to their Elders past, present and emerging.













s 33(a)(iii), s 47C

DISR - for release under FOI s 33(a)(i), s 33(a)(ii), s 33(a)(iii), s 47C

s 33(a)(i), s 33(a)(ii), s 33(a)(iii), s 47C

s 33(a)(i), s 33(a)(iii), s 47C

DISR - for release under FOI s 22, s 33(a)(i), s 33(a)(iii), s 47C

S 22

DISR - for release under FOI s 22, s 33(a)(i), s 33(a)(iii), s 47C

DISR - for release under FOI s 22, s 33(a)(i), s 33(a)(iii), s 47C

s 22, s 33(a)(i), s 33(a)(iii), s 47C

s 22, s 33(a)(iii)

Mason, Geoff From:

Sent: Friday, 16 May 2025 7:19 AM

To:

Ministerial Travel and Overseas Counsellors; Looney, Donna; S 22: S 22
S 22 Chesworth, Peter; Kesteven,
Catherine; Pullen, Victoria; S 22 Murfett, Anthony; Talbot, Louise;
Palermo, Enrico; Dowdell, Michelle; S 22 Oliver, Tara; RSG
- IS&NS - TAE&IB - United States/Canada: English. Dom
S 22 @dfat.gov.au*; S 22 Jeremenko, Robert;
Wilson, Helen; Pickworth, Julia; Office of the Secretary; Quinn, Meghan

Cc:

Subject: Update from DISR DC Post: 9 May - 15 May [SEC=PROTECTED]

Good Morning All,

Update from DISR DC Post: 9 May - 15 May

s 22

s 22

This past week: Meetings we were involved in / events attended: s 45, s 47G

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b), s 45

S 22

S 22

Critical Minerals:

- Dr Gracelin Baskaran (Critical Minerals Security Program, CSIS) testified before the Senate Finance Committee on 'Trade in Critical Supply Chains', a few key statements:
 - "...the United States holds less than 1% of global reserves of cobalt, nickel, and graphite, and only 1.3% of rare earth reserves. To reduce dependence and secure critical mineral supply chains, the United States must lead a global coalition of likeminded allies—leveraging shared resources, coordinating investments, and forging new trade and processing partnerships. This is not just a strategic option—it is an economic and security imperative."
 - "...Given the significant capital requirements and specialized expertise involved, the United States cannot expect to process all critical minerals domestically. Instead, it should build partnerships with trusted allies that are expanding their midstream processing capabilities, including Japan, Australia, Canada, and Saudi Arabia."

S 22

S 22		
	TROTESTES	
	3	
	3	